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| Registros recuperados: 78 | |
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| Wang, Shinn-Shyr; Rojas, Christian; Lavoie, Nathalie. |
| We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Buyer market power; Vertical differentiation; Wal-Mart; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; Industrial Organization; Marketing; D43; L13; L81; M31; Q13. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57165 |
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| Chambolle, Claire; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto. |
| This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality to consumers, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish to differentiate as "only" due to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Buyer Power; Product line; Differentiation; Marketing; L13; L42. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6866 |
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| Mondello, Gerard. |
| Ultra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Electric Energy; Nuclear Plants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q5; Q58; Q53; K23; L13; L52; L94. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102571 |
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| Russo, Carlo. |
| Despite the increasing importance of market power in the food industry, most policy models assume perfect competition. Ignoring market power may lead economists to make incorrect, or at least misleading, policy recommendations. In this paper I develop a theoretical model in which market power can alter conclusions regarding the welfare effects of a specific policy change: replacing deficiency payments with decoupled payments to farmers, and apply it to the U.S. wheat market and milling industry. The main conclusions of the theoretical model are that, middlemens market power may cause i) an increase in public expenditure, ii) an extraction of policy rents from the taxpayers by the middlemen, and iii) a reduction of the social benefit from decoupling... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Decoupling; Deficiency Payments; Market Power; Financial Economics; Q18; L13. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9767 |
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| Buhler, Benno. |
| We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at inefficiently high wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Roaming; Vertical Relations; Regulation; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; L42; L96. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55292 |
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| Registros recuperados: 78 | |
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